Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security

Rajesh M. Basrur

In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear programme offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

[Studies in Asian Security: A Series Sponsored by the East-West Center Washington and a Co-Publication with Stanford University Press]

Rajesh M. BASRUR is Director of the Centre of Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a Visiting Fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.

publication year: 2009
264 pages
ISBN: 978-9971-69-444-9  Paperback  US$30.00  S$38.00

Our edition is available in Australia, New Zealand, East and Southeast Asia except Myanmar.