Journal of Chinese Overseas

November 2005: volume 1, number 2

This article traces the early stages of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia and examines the relationship between the Chinese pioneers in the region and the opium trade of the British. The article stresses the importance of the "Water Frontier" settlements in the Gulf of Siam and the Malay Peninsula. It suggests that opium changed the relationship between Chinese merchant-capitalists and Chinese laborers in the region and acted as the basis for a long-term partnership between the merchants and the colonial powers with wealthy Chinese merchants acting as opium revenue farmers. In particular, it argues that the peranakan Chinese or locally-born Chinese, particularly those in Singapore and the other Straits Settlements, emerged as the key figures in the opium farming syndicates that grew up in Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century.

The place of opium in the history of the Chinese diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean has received scant attention. This paper is a preliminary attempt to look into this history, based on fragmentary evidence available. From 1847 to 1874, as many as 225,000 Chinese indentured or contract laborers (coolies), almost all men, were sent to Cuba, still a Spanish colony, and newly independent Peru. Both the human trade itself, as well as work and life on the plantations, closely resembled slavery; indeed, the coolies in Cuba worked alongside African slaves. Opium was part of the coolie trade from its inception, distributed in the holding pens in South China ports, on the long, arduous voyages across the Pacific or Atlantic, as well as on the plantations. Cuban and Peruvian planters permitted, even encouraged, the sale, barter and consumption of opium by their coolies, in effect creating a mechanism of social control by alternately distributing and withholding this very addictive substance to desperate men. But this cynical use of opium might also have backfired on them, as sustained and massive ingestion lowered productivity, caused premature death (often by suicide), and resulted in high absenteeism.

G. William Skinner's early work on the Chinese of Thailand anticipated the spatial concerns that he later brought to the study of Chinese history. The present article revisits Skinner's 1957 classic "Chinese Society in Thailand" to highlight its overlooked spatial dimension and its emphasis on the role of Chinese in patterns of spatial change in Thai history. It then applies the formal approaches pioneered in Skinner's work on spatial dimensions of Chinese history to the Thai case. A two-factor regional-systems model for twentieth-century Thailand is developed in explicit imitation of Skinner's modeling of China's "macroregions." The model illustrates long-term trends toward the tighter integration of ThailandŐs Bangkok-centered national-level regional system, the importance of numerous patterns of more local spatial change, the significance of extra-systemic influences on the system, and the role of Chinese as significant participants and agents in each of these processes. Results also suggest the need for further work on spatial dimensions of modern Thai and Southeast Asian history and on the role of Chinese as agents of spatial change in the region.

This article examines the contested identity of a particular group of Viet-kieu, who were born in China and who returned to Vietnam in the 1970s, by looking into their personal histories, descent backgrounds and the political and socio-economic processes they lived through in the past few decades. Unlike other Viet-kieu who returned from the West, the Viet-kieu in the borderlands rarely received any attention from the media or the academia. They led a double life both in China and in Vietnam and experienced dramatic changes of fate from the 1970s, through the 1980s, to the 1990s. Their hybrid cultural endowment and cross-border familial ties were both detrimental and beneficial to their social and economic life within different historical contexts. Reopened borders around the world in the post-Cold War era have generated discourses on transnational economic integration, regional connectedness, as well as fluid mobility and identities. It has become a fashion to criticize the study of culture and identity as rigid entities, while the increasing stress on subjectivity and agency has made identity seem ever more evolving and changing. Putting aside the romantic notion of fluid and multiple identities, this article brings up a number of empirical cases to illustrate how identity is often shaped by the possibilities and constraints under different politico-economic circumstances.

Dalforce, or the Singapore Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army as it was more popularly known among the Chinese community, was a hastily formed volunteer army created just before the fall of Singapore in February 1942. It was made up of 1,000-3,000 Chinese volunteers from all walks of life and political persuasions. Dalforce companies, armed with limited weapons and ammunition, were sent to defend the different fronts of Singapore Island after only a short stint of training. The soldiers of Dalforce, alongside the Australian, Indian and British armies, fought the Japanese invasion during the Battle for Singapore. The Overseas Chinese community in Singapore saw Dalforce as a medium through which they could join in the struggle, together with their comrades in China, against an aggressive and belligerent Japan. This small army became a symbol of something their comrades in China failed to truly achieve -- the ability to unite in one force against a common enemy. The exploits of this little army became an Overseas Chinese legend.

In this article, we attempt to develop a conceptual framework of "ethnic capital" in order to examine the dynamics of immigrant communities. Building on the theories of social capital and the enclave economy, we argue that ethnic capital is not a thing but involves interactive processes of ethnic-specific financial capital, human capital, and social capital. We use case studies of century-old Chinatowns and emerging middle-class immigrant Chinese communities in New York and Los Angeles to illustrate how ethnic capital affects community building and transformation, which in turn influence the social mobility of immigrants. We also discuss how developments in contemporary ethnic enclaves challenge the conventional notion of assimilation and contribute to our understanding of immigrant social mobility.