Abstract

In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this to the fore. We argue for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. In this study, we use agency theory to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. This argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in the ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value even where the interests of stakeholders were more emphasized.

About the Speaker

Assoc Professor Toru Yoshikawa teaches Seminar in Strategic Management, International Management and Management (Introductory course) at the College of Commerce, Nihon University, Tokyo Japan. Prior to this, he was Course Director of Environmental Framework for Management, Schulich School of Business, York University Toronto, Canada in 1995. He was also Vice President of Wood Gundy Inc. (Canadian investment banking firm), Investment Banking Department, Toronto, Canada from 1992 to 1993, and Asst Vice-President of Wood Gundy Inc., Capital Markets Department Toronto, Canada from 1989 to 1992. A/P Yoshikawa's current research interests are in Corporate Governance (Japanese and comparative), Corporate Governance of Venture Firms in Asia and Corporate Strategy of Service Firms. A/P Yoshikawa attended Meiji University, Tokyo Japan (Bachelor of Law, 1983), Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA (Master of Arts in Political Science 1985), University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada (Master of Arts in Political Science 1993), and York University, Toronto, Canada (Ph.D., 1997).