Moral Psychology

Coordinator: Professor John D Greenwood, Department of Philosophy

Project Description and Scope

The aim of the reading group is to explore the new questions and puzzles generated by the recent exciting explosion of empirical studies of moral psychology and their implication for contemporary debates in moral philosophy and applied ethics.

These include evolutionary studies that suggest that we employ different evolved neurocomputational systems when reasoning about moral conditionals (what we ought to do if…), so that we should not expect there to be a unified and integrated deontic logic (a logic of “ought”); that moral prohibitions against behavior such as incest are grounded in sentiments or aversions that are byproducts of evolution; that moral virtues such as kindness, fidelity, magnanimity and heroism are products of sexual selection; that human morality is a byproduct of the evolutionary development of symbolic thought; that humans are possessed of an innate universal moral grammar analogous to a Chomskian universal linguistic grammar, or at least constrained by innate biases that make certain moral prohibitions and prescriptions more likely than others; and that there are no hard-wired biological constraints on morality, whose limits are only the limits of our creative cultural construction (not all of these implications are consistent, of course). These include empirical studies in cognitive science that suggest that moral intuition is a form of cognitive heuristic, subject to the same types of irrational biases and unreliability as cognitive heuristics in general, and especially vulnerable to framing effects in the conceptualization of moral situations; that suggest that moral intuitions are analogous to Chomskian linguistic intuitions, universal moral principles that are grounded in innate and unconscious cognitive mechanisms; that suggest that moral intuitions are originally emotional but formed into moral judgments in the service of social goals, or in accord with “emotion rules”; that there are fundamental and intractable differences in moral intuitions between individuals and cultures; that our moral language is semantically incoherent, being employed for inconsistent purposes; and which challenge the “folk-psychological” theory that our judgments about moral responsibility for action are based upon judgments about agent causation of action. These include studies from cognitive neuroscience that suggest (on the basis of brain imaging studies) that moral emotions have distinctive phenomenologies best explained by their intentional contents, and are consequently not categorically distinct from cognition in general; that suggest that deontological moral judgments are rationalizations based on emotions and that the only genuine moral judgments are those based upon consequentialist reasoning in terms of cost-benefit analysis; that question the degree to which morality can be grounded in cognitive intelligence, given that psychopaths and sociopaths are not generally deficient in intelligence and seem to have no difficulty in forming third person hypothetical moral judgments; that suggest that autistics who lack emotional empathy develop forms of disinterested concern for others that approximate Kant’s rationalist theory of morality; that suggest that moral development is based upon social categorizations of behavior that have lost their social power in contemporary Western culture; and that disruptions to moral development in adolescence can lead to major moral transgressions that do not appear to be rooted in any discernable psychopathology.

"Moral Psychology is a remarkable publishing achievement. Sinnott-Armstrong has a real talent for drawing together the cutting-edge researchers in the field, and letting them present their positions and challenge each other. These three substantial volumes cover many of the newer and more exciting issues being raised in ethics and moral psychology today. Essential reading for anyone who wants to know where the field is heading.”
-- Peter Singer, Ira W. Decamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University

"Moral Psychology represents a powerful and penetrating discussion of the emerging science of moral behavior. Each volume cross-examines important arguments which lead to fascinating dialogues on this compelling subject.”
-- Michael S. Gazzaniga, Director, Sage Center for the Study of the Mind, University of California, Santa Barbara

"In the last decade moral psychology has been transformed into one of the most interesting and important areas of interdisciplinary research--a field where philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and economists interact productively. Recent theories and findings have generated a genuine and justified sense of intellectual excitement. If you want to see what all the excitement is about, this book is a great place to start."
-- Stephen Stich, Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Rutgers University

Meeting Schedule and Events

The group will meet on Thursday mornings 9-11am every two weeks, beginning October 9 and continuing to the end of semester 1 and throughout semester 2. The readings for the group will be drawn from the recent three-volume collection of articles that present and discuss the implications for moral psychology of recent research on evolutionary biology, cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. The volumes are published by MIT Press and edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:

  • Moral Psychology: Vol. 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness
  • Moral Psychology: Vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity
  • Moral Psychology: Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development

The plan for semester 1 is as follows. Meeting venue : seminar room AS3/0302.

  • Thursday, October 9, 9-11: deontic logic and incest (Vol 1: Chaps 2-2.4; 3-3.3)
  • Thursday, October 23, 9-11: moral virtues and sexual selection; morality and the evolution of symbolic thought (Vol 1: Chaps 4-4.3; 5-5.3)
  • Thursday, November 6, 9-11: innate moral structures (Vol 1: Chaps 6-6.3; 7-7.3)

Participants who purchase the books will be eligible for a refund from the support grant for the reading group. For those who merely want to dip, the books are on reserve in the Central Library Reserve Book Room. We also hope to have some invited speakers, such as Jesse Prinz, John J Roberts Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

List of Participants

  • John D Greenwood, Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, NUS, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, City College and Graduate Center, City University of New York phigjd@nus.edu.sg
  • Klaus Georg Boehnke, Visiting Professor, Department of Psychology, NUS , Professor of Social Science Methodology, Jacobs University, Bremen psykgb@nus.edu.sg
  • Justine Burley, Associate Professor and Deputy Executive Director, NUS Graduate School for Integrative Sciences and Engineering justineburley@nus.edu.sg
  • Lo Yuet Keung, Associate Professor, Department of Chinese Studies, NUS chsloyk@nus.edu.sg
  • Cecilia Lim, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, NUS philimtn@nus.edu.sg
  • Tan Sor Hoon, Associate Professor & Head, Department of Philosophy, NUS phitsh@nus.edu.sg
  • Axel Gelfert, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, NUS phigah@nus.edu.sg
  • Christopher Anthony Brown, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, NUS phicab@nus.edu.sg
  • David Tien, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, NUS phidwt@nus.edu.sg
  • Ilya Farber, Assistant Professor of Social Science and Philosophy, Singapore Management University (Cognitive Scientist from UC-San Diego) ifarber@smu.edu.sg
  • Neiladri Sinhababu, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, NUS phins@gc.cuny.edu
  • Kim Myeong Seok, Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, NUS phikms@nus.edu.sg
  • Alexandra May Serrenti, Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, NUS phisam@nus.edu.sg
  • Nanthinee Jeevanandam, PhD student, Biology Department, NUS g0700563@nus.edu.sg